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while American policies target the vast majority of women, this approach is unnec-
essary and potentially neglects the populations most adversely affected by prenatal
drinking.
In chapters 6 and 7 Armstrong examines the conditions by which this misguided
focus emerged within the United States. She concludes that at the heart of American
understandings of FAS and the relationship between alcohol and offspring is a larger
latent agenda predicated on the preservation of a particular social order and set of
institutionalized gender roles and relationships; a denial of collective social respon-
sibility for future generations through the individualizing of blame; dismissal of the
role of social inequalities in women’s lives; marginalization of the associated risks of
maternal drinking and the social suffering that underlies it; and a displacement of risk
and responsibility that effectively ignores the societal burden generated by men’s
drinking, which is vastly greater than that caused by women’s drinking. The confla-
tion of risk with immorality provides the conditions for this agenda despite signifi-
cant medical uncertainty and ambiguity; it is also reflected in the equating of prenatal
alcohol exposure with child abuse and evident in American policy responses to FAS
that are typically punitive rather than preventative.
Armstrong’s analysis provides important insight into questions of risk and respon-
sibility that have direct implications for policy makers. While I would like to believe
that her analysis and the direction she lays out for public policy in her final chapter
will be a catalyst to mobilize more appropriate supports for women and their chil-
dren, I see little within American medical or social landscapes to think that this will
happen. Policy makers in the United States and North America more generally have
invested highly in an individualized approach to FAS prevention as it presents the
illusion that broad-based public policies can effectively mobilize action to prevent
and treat the physical disorder of FAS. Unfortunately, as Armstrong so convincingly
articulates, “this individualized approach ... will never cure either the individual
cases of FAS or the social disorder that is at the root of the syndrome” (p. 219).
Caroline L. Tait
University of Saskatchewan
BELHOSTE, Bruno — La Formation d’une technocratie : l’École polytechnique et
ses élèves de la Révolution au Second Empire, Paris, Belin, 2003, 508 p.
In 1848 Victor Hugo saw the École polytechnique as a part — along with the Institut
and the Legion of Honour — of a Holy Trinity of institutions that were as insepara-
ble from the idea of republican France as the tricolour flag. From its foundation in
1794, the school has enjoyed immense prestige and its graduates have populated the
upper reaches of the technical administrations of the state, both military and civilian.
It naturally attracted impassioned defenders and attackers, and its first history was
written as early as 1828 by Ambroise Fourcy. Many of the histories incorporated an
agenda of either praising or denigrating the school, and only in the twentieth century
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has a more professional historical approach appeared. Bruno Belhoste’s book is the
latest, the most complete, and the best. Indeed, it will remain the definitive work on
the subject, not only because of the author’s fine handling of the subject matter, but
also, according to Belhoste, because the famous school has no future. It is “too little,
too French, too military”. Its system of competitive examinations (the concours) and
its privileged access to the public administrative sector are doomed and, although it
might be too hard to abolish a name so glorious, it attained what was essentially its
final form at the end of the Second Empire (hence the chronological limit of the
book). This form, which remained solid for most of the following century, is now
dissolving. The time has truly come to write its history.
Belhoste has devoted more than 20 years to his subject and brings many valuable
qualifications to his work. He is a historian of mathematics (the author of a fine
book on the great mathematician and polytechnician Augustin-Louis Cauchy), a his-
torian of education, and a competent social historian to boot. All these qualities are
necessary to do justice to the history of an institution that was closely associated
with some of the best scientists of nineteenth-century Europe, particularly mathema-
ticians; that served as a template for the French system of the grandes écoles; and
that was central to the formation of elites in modern France.
The book is divided into three parts. The first, on the development of the galaxy of
institutions in which the school appeared and evolved, goes beyond a narrow look at
the school to consider the system of military technical schools of the Old Regime
and their successors — the écoles d’application (the Military Engineering and Artil-
lery School, the School of Roads and Bridges, the School of Mines, among others)
that emerged after the Revolution and achieved a certain unity, if not homogeneity,
by being required to recruit their students exclusively from the Polytechnique. The
school also stood between an elaborate system of public and private feeder schools
upstream and the specialized technical schools downstream. The second part of the
book examines course content, curriculum, and the ways in which the curriculum
reflected the social and cultural pressures on the school by the technocracy that it
nurtured and served. Belhoste deliberately uses the anachronistic American neolo-
gism “technocracy” in his title to emphasize the school’s dominant role in creating a
new social configuration and mentality that gradually came to be accepted by the
dominant elites of France near the end of the Second Empire.
The first decades of the École polytechnique’s history saw a stupendous flourish-
ing of mathematical talent in France. Lagrange and Laplace (professor and examiner
respectively) found worthy successors in Fourier, Poisson, Cauchy, Ampère, Poin-
sot, and other graduates of the school. Indeed, mathematics dominated the school’s
curriculum to the extent that it was accused of being an école monotechnique instead
of polytechnique. Moreover, the mathematics was heavily concentrated on abstract
analysis. Descriptive geometry, developed by the school’s initial driving spirit, the
mathematician Gaspard Monge, gradually receded to a secondary position. Monge’s
vision of descriptive geometry as a mathematical descriptive language that would be
a tool for the researcher and the artisan, with multiple practical applications, gave
way to analysis perceived as an admirable culture of the mind as much as a useful
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tool in mechanics. This is, to some extent, a simplification, and Belhoste is aware of
all its nuances and does a good job in giving us the complete story.
The final section deals with the students, detailing their social origins, the cult of
meritocracy that grew out of the concours, the conditioning of bodies and minds in
its military boarding school regime after 1804, the students’ involvement in the rev-
olutions of 1830 and 1848, and the ever more prestigious image of the polytechni-
cian that developed during the nineteenth century. Here Belhoste carefully sifts the
spotty evidence of earlier historians to conclude that the Polytechnique drew its stu-
dents from the middle and lower ranks of the bourgeoisie, the sons of professionals
and government employees, both military and civilian. The offspring of the domi-
nant classes in French society (the notables) were in a minority, and offspring of the
lower labouring classes were virtually absent. The students’ reputation for radical-
ism was overblown: on the whole, polytechnicians tended to favour order, preferably
republican, and faithfully to serve the state.
In the immediate aftermath of the exalted Jacobin dictatorship when the school
was founded, professors like Monge espoused an ideal of democratizing science and
technology and of putting theoretical science at the service of talented artisans to
supplement the practical knowledge that they would acquire on the job. In no more
than a year, this ideal evaporated, in part because of a certain idealistic fuzziness in
its conception and in part because of the pressures of the military technical schools
attempting to reassert themselves after their eclipse during the Revolution. Instead
of a school intimately tied to the productive elements of society, the Polytechnique
became a school of technocrats who believed in the primacy of abstract theoretical
knowledge, not only for its potential social cachet, but also because of the belief that
technical expertise was a product of the application of theory to practice by the for-
mally educated engineer. The eminent scientists at the school supported this view as
well because it gave science a key role of mediation and attracted support from the
state technical bureaucracy, especially the military. The survival and growing pres-
tige of the school that this external support brought came at a price. The needs of the
technocracy became ever more insistent, to the detriment of science. By the 1850s
the centre of gravity of original scientific research had passed from the school to
institutions like the École normale supérieure and the University, in spite of the
school’s remarkable quality of theoretical instruction and improved practical
instruction.
The 1850s also saw the implementation of the Le Verrier reforms. The school was
firmly bound to the specialized application schools with some decline of analysis and
the strengthening of more practical subjects. Nominally this development marked a
return to the ideals of Monge, but the school nevertheless retained a strong emphasis
on theory, as much for its role in giving social legitimacy to technocracy as for its
methodical and systematic approach to practical problems. In the half century since
the school’s foundation, its technocratic ideals, once kept at arm’s length by domi-
nant elites, had come to be accepted and admired, impregnating the state bureau-
cracy. Its scientific dominance, however, had passed. The story that Belhoste tells so
well about this complex and fascinating phenomenon is not only essential for the
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understanding of modern France, but gives insights into the technocratic ethos of all
modern societies.
Janis Langins
Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology
University of Toronto
BLATTBERG, Charles — Shall We Dance? A Patriotic Politics for Canada. Montreal
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003. Pp. 196.
Charles Blattberg begins from the premise that Canadians are homesick, that we are
unable to feel at home in our own country (p. 6). From this premise he proceeds to
outline the reasons behind our alienation and to propose a way of moving forward to
a political culture rooted in a shared conversation and a common citizenship, “a citi-
zenship of we” (p. 37).
Blattberg believes that Canadian political dialogue is flawed: it is either monar-
chist or polyarchist. “According to monarchists, justice demands that there be a sin-
gle sovereign authority to which all those involved in the most important political
conflicts must appeal, doing so by pleading their cases to that authority” (p. 10).
Blattberg identifies this approach to conflict resolution with Pierre Trudeau and the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. According to Blattberg, it is misguided to think in
terms of a single sovereign authority in a constitution based on the Crown and the
people and in a society with competing values. Moreover, the act of pleading is not
really dialogue at all: it is monologue at best, a shouting match at worst, and there is
no promise of transformation on the part of participants. Meanwhile, the polyarchist
approach to politics and political conflict has the advantage of recognizing that
“there are just too many incompatible visions of justice in the world for any one of
them to be granted absolute sovereign authority” (p. 16). In addition, negotiation is
at the heart of the polyarchist approach to politics. If better than pleading, however,
negotiation is adversarial in nature and “only confirms the divisions” in society
when what is required is an acknowledgement of what values and goals citizens
share (p. 34). Like pleading, negotiation fails to transform participants because it
“only works when people’s backs are up against the wall, and no one likes having
his back up against the wall” (p. 85).
Between pleading on one hand and negotiation on the other, Blattberg proposes
conversation as the best means to resolve political conflict. Unlike pleading, in
which the winner takes all, and negotiation, in which both parties must put water in
their wine, conversation assumes a willingness to listen and an openness to transfor-
mation. It promises reconciliation.
And just as good dancing is not a matter of two separate beings coordinating each other’s
independent movements, successful conversation does not arise from the exchange of
information between wholly separate interlocutors, for the aim is always to express
something meaningful together, which is to say, to be in harmony with, to share in com-
mon, something that matters, something that they believe is at least partly constitutive of
